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COUNTERMANDED CHECKS AND
FAIR DEALING UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
WILLIAM LOUIS TABAC*
INTRODUCTION
Under the Uniform Commercial Code ("Code"), 1 a bank customer
has a virtually unqualified right to stop payment of a check. 2 The right
can be exercised for any reason, or for no reason at all. 3 Countermanded
checks are not "properly payable," 4 therefore, the bank cannot charge the
customer's account. 5 Nor can the bank excuse the improper payment by
*Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law.
'U.C.C. § 4-403 (1987).
2E.g., Del State Bank v. Patton, 513 P.2d 868 (Okla. 1973). "The position
taken by this section is that stopping payment is a service which depositors expect
and are entitled to receive from banks notwithstanding its difficulty,
inconvenience and expense." U.C.C. § 4-403 official comment 2.
3See Berler v. Barclays Bank, 82 A.D.2d 437, 439, 442 N.Y.S.2d 54, 55(1981) (the right is "absolute"; "[The Code] makes clear that a stop payment
order need not be supported by a sound legal basis"); Sunshine v. Banker's
Trust Co., 34 N.Y.2d 404, 413 n.5, 314 N.E.2d 860, 865 n.5, 358 N.Y.S.2d
113, 121 n.5 (1974), modified, 34 N.Y. 2d 994, 318 N.E.2d 608, 360 N.Y.S.2d
419 (1974).
4U.C.C. § 4-401(1) provides:
As against its customer, a bank may charge against his account any item which
is otherwise properly payable from that account even though the charge creates
an overdraft.
Since the section does not define the term, "[The question of what is 'properly
payable' can be resolved by examining the deposit agreement and specific
U.C.C. provisions regulating bank/customer relationships." G & R Corp. v.
American Sec. & Trust Co., 523 F.2d 1164, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
5E.g., Able & Assocs., Inc. v. Orchard Hill Farms, 77 111. App. 3d 375, 395
N.E.2d 1138 (1979). In Dynamite Enters., Inc. v. Eagle Nat'l Bank, 517 So. 2d
112 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (per curiam), a customer sought to stop payment
of a check because his account contained insufficient funds. The court pointed
out that, while a customer's account can properly be charged when the bank
creates an overdraft by paying a check (see U. C. C. § 4-401(1)), the customer can,
by his stop payment order, remove the bank's discretion from so doing and
prohibit the charge. Dynamite Enters., 517 So. 2d at 112-13.
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pointing to a waiver of the right to stop payment 6 or an exculpatory clause
in the contract of deposit. 7 If the bank has enough time to act on the stop
payment order 8 and it reasonably identifies the check, 9 the stop payment
order is "binding," 10 and must be obeyed.
In reality, no right is absolute, including the right to stop payment. This
can be a particularly harsh reality for bank customers. Banks routinely
charge their customers' accounts when they make improper payments. As a
result, absent overdraft privileges, checks that the customer writes on the
assumption that there are sufficient funds in the account to cover these checks
will be returned for "not sufficient funds" ("NSF"). The bank that improp-
erly pays then requires the customer to convince it that the account should be
recredited 1l and that it should make amends for the bounced checks.
12
To preserve good will and avoid litigation costs, the bank may accede
to these requests with no more than an affidavit from its customer alleging
that an improper payment was made.1 3 When it will be more cost efficent
6See Del State Bank, 513 P.2d at 868; Thomas v. Bank of Springfield, 631
S.W.2d 346 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (oral stop order effective because bank waived
contractual right to written notice); see generally WHITE & SUMMERS,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (3d ed.
1988) [hereinafter WHITE & SUMMERS].
7Under U.C.C. § 4-103(1), a bank may not disclaim responsibility "for its own
lack of good faith or failure to exercise ordinary care . . . ." If the customer files a
binding stop payment order and the bank nevertheless pays, the bank would seem to
act either in bad faith or carelessly. In any event, some courts have held that
exculpatory clauses in stop payment cases are void as against public policy
irrespective of bad faith or negligence. See Stanek v. National Bank, 171 Mich. App.
734, 739, 430 N.W.2d 819, 821 (1988), appeal denied, 432 Mich. 885 (1989); Thomas
v. First Nat'l Bank, 376 Pa. 181, 185-88, 101 A.2d 910, 911-12 (1954).
8U.C.C. § 4-403(1); see id. § 4-303.
9Sherrill v. Frank Morris Pontiac-Buick-GMC, 366 So. 2d 251, 256 (Ala.
1979) (check need only be identified with reasonable accuracy).
'
0U.C.C. § 4-403(2) (fourteen calendar days if oral, six months if in
writing). Considerable litigation has arisen over whether an order was
"binding." E.g., Kunkle v. First Nat'l Bank, 393 N.W.2d 265 (N.D. 1986).
"The customer's right to a recredit is implied from U.C.C. section 4-401.
Isaac v. American Heritage Bank & Trust Co., 675 P.2d 742, 744 (Colo. 1984)
(en banc). "The negative implication [from section 4-401] that a bank may not
charge against an account an item that is not properly payable is clear. In such
case the customer may demand that his account be recredited." Id. at 744.
12Section 4-402(1) provides that, "A payor bank is liable to its customer for
damages proximately caused by the wrongful dishonor of an item . . . .A check
is wrongfully dishonored if it should have been paid." Eaton Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co. v. Welcome, No. CA86-03-007 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 13, 1986)
(WESTLAW, 724 at 12).
13See Marine Midland Bank v. Umber, 96 Misc. 2d 835, 410 N.Y.S.2d 25 (1978).
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to litigate the claim, however, the banks' response to its customers is apt to
be a terse, "see you in court." 14
Banks exercise great discretion in determining whether to recredit
after a wrongful charge for an improper payment. Under the Code,
however, losses resulting from improper payments are supposed to settle
on "culpable" 15 parties. This design may be frustrated when a bank
charges a customer's account for an item that was not properly payable,
bounces a check, and then refuses to acknowledge its error. Confronted
with litigation costs that outweigh the losses that result from the improper
payment, the customer will be unwilling, or unable, to commence the loss
shifting process that the Code drafters contemplated.
Today, however, the "see you in court" attitude tends to backfire. Banks
risk liability for improper payments that can dwarf the disputed items and
their consequent litigation costs if they adopt this attitude. A new and contro-
versial tort, breach of the covenant of fair dealing, subjects banks to punitive
damages for mishandling their customers' funds. At least one court has
stated that the tort will occur when the stonewalling party knows that the
aggrieved party "cannot afford to contest the matter in court.' 16
This article evaluates the potential effect of this tort on the bank and
its customer where the improper payment is an indisputable 17 binding
stop payment order. Part I examines a bank's duty to properly pay
checks. 18 Part II describes the bank's reimbursement rights. 19 Part III
examines the breach of covenant of good faith tort. 20 Part IV analyzes
liability under the Code. 21 Part V argues that banks must promptly
1In almost all the reported stop payment cases, the customer sued the bank
for a recredit. Two exceptions are Ward v. First Nat'l Bank, aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 94 N.M. 701, 616 P.2d 414 (1980), and Middle Georgia Bank v.
Continental Real Estate & Assoc., 168 Ga. App. 611, 309 S.E.2d. 893 (1983).
"According to Professor Phillips, who coined the term, the most culpable
parties are those, like forgers, who intentionally cause the loss. Beneath them on
the scale are parties who know of a problem with the instrument, followed by
parties who carelessly cause the loss. On the bottom rung are parties who, under
strict liability principles, could have avoided the loss at the least cost. Phillips, The
Commercial Culpability Scale, 92 YALE L.J. 228, 228 (1982).
16Romero v. Mervyn's, 109 N.M. 249, 258 n.6, 784 P.2d 992, 1001 n.6
(1989).
17The same argument would apply whenever the improper payment is
indisputable e.g., incompleted checks or checks without necessary signatures are
paid. See infra note 26.
18See infra notes 23-41 and accompanying text.
19See infra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
2
°See infra notes 49-61 and accompanying text.
21See infra notes 62-76 and accompanying text.
HeinOnline  -- 10 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 253 1991
ANNUAL REVIEW OF BANKING LAW / 1991
recredit customers' accounts when banks improperly pay over binding
stop payment orders. 2 2 The article concludes that upon being notified
that it has overlooked a binding stop payment order, a bank must
promptly recredit the customer's account, pay interest on the withheld
funds, and make good on any NSF checks. A refusal to do so exposes it to
tort damages for breach of the convenant of fair dealing.
I. A BANK'S DUTY TO PROPERLY PAY CHECKS
A check orders a bank to disburse funds credited on its books23 to its
customer 24 in accordance with the check's terms. The bank looks to the
check for its payment duties in all cases except that the check may be counter-
manded by an oral stop payment order.25 These commands, written or oral,
must be strictly obeyed. If they are breached, the check is not "properly
payable" and the bank cannot charge its customer's account.
2 6
There are several reasons a bank might improperly pay a check. A
careful bank may not be able to determine that its customer's signature
was expertly forged, 27 skillfully altered 2 8 or endorsed by the wrong
person. 29 A careless or fruga °30 bank might overlook crude forgeries,
22See infra notes 77-102 and accompanying text.
23See P.M.F. Serv., Inc. v. Grady, 698 F. Supp. 141 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Susen
v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 111 Ill. App. 3d 909, 444 N.E.2d 701 (1982)
(debtor-creditor relationship between customer and bank); Stone & Webster
Eng'g Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust, 345 Mass. 1, 184 N.E.2d 358 (1962).
24See U.C.C. § 4-104(1)(e). The bank handles the customer's "items."
These are "instrument[s] for the payment of money." Id. § 4-10 4 (1)(g). A
"check" is an Article 3 instrument drawn on a bank. See id. §§ 3-102(1)(e), 3-
104(2)(b).
25U.C.C. § 4-403(2).
2 6Id. § 4-104(a).
27U.C.C. § 3-401(a) provides: "[N]o person is liable on an instrument
unless his signature appears thereon."
28Under U.C.C. § 3-407, a drawer is discharged on both the instrument and
the underlying obligation by a fraudulent and material alteration as defined in
that section.
29A "holder" is the person who is entitled to enforce the instrument. See
U.C.C. § 1-201(20); id. § 3-603(1). To negotiate an order instrument to a
"holder", the instrument must be both delivered and "endorsed" by the current
holder or someone authorized to affix his endorsement. See id. §§ 3-202, 3-404. A
person having the "rights" of a holder may also enforce the instrument. See id.
§§ 3-603, 3-201.
3 0To cut costs, some banks do not examine checks below a certain dollar
amount for signatures. See Five Towns College v. Citibank, N.A., 108 A.D.2d
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alterations or missing signatures. 31 These banks also pay postdated checks
prematurely32 or over binding stop payment orders. Regardless, none of
these checks are "properly payable." 33 By debiting them against the
customer's account, the bank breaches the contract of deposit.
The Code requires that customers help the bank avoid making
improper payments. For example, customers must act with due care to
prevent their checks from falling into the wrong hands. 3 4 They must also
alert the banks to their unauthorized signatures 35 or material
alterations. 3 6 These are, however, secondary duties under the Code. The
bank is strictly liable for improper payment. 3 7 Finally, even if the
customer has failed to protect the bank in these ways, the customer can
still assert liability against the bank if it can demonstrate that the bank did
not act with due care in paying the item. 38
Although these mutual duties to avoid improper payments are
established by the Code, they may be modified by the contract of deposit.
Under this contract, the parties may shape the standards governing their
relationship. 39 However, bargaining between the customer and the bank
only goes so far. The Code prohibits the bank from disclaiming its
420, 489 N.Y.S.2d 338 (1985) (bank did not attempt to verify all signatures
because of time constraints).
31See Spec-Cast, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 128 Ill. 2d 167, 538
N.E.2d 543 (1989) (check missing drawer's signature); Ford Motor Credit Co. v.
United States Automobile Ass'n, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 361 (Aug.
21, 1972) (check missing indorsement).
32Because it orders the bank to pay on or after its date, a postdated check is
not properly payable before its date. See U.C.C. § 3-114(2); see also Siegel v. New
England Merchants Nat'l Bank, 386 Mass. 672, 675, 437 N.E.2d 218, 221
(1982).
33Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Chemical Bank, 57
N.Y.2d 439, 445-46, 442 N.E.2d 1253, 1256 (1982) (forged indorsement);
Winkie, Inc. v. Heritage Bank, 99 Wis. 2d 616, 622, 299 N.W.2d 829, 834
(1981) (forged check); see also City Nat'l Bank v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 150 Cal.
App. 3d 290, 197 Cal. Rptr. 721 (1983) (materially altered check), appeal
dismissed en banc, 38 Cal. 3d 243, 695 P.2d 1058, 211 Cal. Rptr. 517 (1985).
Certain materially altered items are, however, properly payable. See U.C.C. § 4-
401(2).
34U.C.C. § 3-406.
35Id. § 4-406(1).
36Id.
37See generally McDonnell, Bank Liability for Fraudulent Checks: The Clash of the
Utilitarian and Paternalistic Creeds Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 73 GEO L.J.
1399 (1985).
381d. at 1408-09.
39U.C.C. § 4-103.
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obligations to act in good faith and with due care. 40 Additionally, none of
the customer's backup duties apply to binding stop payment orders. If the
order was binding, the payment was improper.41 The bank can neither
charge its customer's account nor blame its customer for its error.
Nevertheless, under the Code, the bank need not just accept its loss.
The Code affords the bank methods to indemnify itself when it makes an
improper payment for which it is prohibited from charging its customer's
account.
II. THE BANK'S REIMBURSEMENT RIGHTS
When a bank pays a check, properly or not, the bank pays out its own
funds. This is due to the nature of the customer bank relationship. As a
"debtor" to its checking account customers, the bank does not hold their
funds in specie. 4 2 Thus, the bank neither disburses its customer's
property when it pays an item nor restores it when it admits that an
improper payment was made. Rather, the bank simply acknowledges the
amount of its indebtedness to its customers on its books. When it properly
pays an item, the bank may debit the account and seek reimbursement
from its customer. 43 Upon an improper payment, however, the bank may
not debit the account 44 and it must seek reimbursement from the party
most culpable under the Code's scheme.
Under the reciprocal policies of preventing unjust enrichment and
loss, the Code affords the payor bank several methods by which it can
reimburse itself when it makes an improper payment; the loss may be
placed on the most culpable party.45 Customers must establish that
401d.
41
"A payment in violation of an effective direction to stop payment is an
improper payment, even though it is made by mistake or inadvertance." U.C.C.
§ 4-403 official comment 8.
42See Susen, 111 111. App. 3d at 913, 444 N.E.2d at 704 (title to funds passes
from customer to bank).
43
"[T]he draft itself authorizes the payment for the drawer's account and
carries an implied promise to reimburse the drawee." U.C.C. § 4-401 official
comment 1. E.g., Continental Bank v. Fitting, 114 Ariz. 98, 100, 559 P.2d 218,
220 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) (citing U.C.C. § 4-401 official comment 1).
44E.g., AmSouth v. Spigener, 505 So. 2d 1030 (Ala. 1986).
45U.C.C. section 4-407 authorizes the payor bank to seek reimbursement for
improperly paying over a binding stop payment order, or other circumstances
otherwise giving the drawer "a basis for objection" for the payment.
Consequently, it affords the payor bank a general reimbursement remedy
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improper payments were made before the bank will have any duty to
recredit and begin considering reimbursement. In alteration and forgery
cases, that fact may not become indisputably settled until the issue has
been litigated in a customer initiated lawsuit. However, where the bank
has received and overlooked a timely stop payment order, no such fact
finding is necessary. Thus, improper payment was made and the bank is
deemed to be aware of its breach as soon as the customer notifies the
bank.
The Code does not explicitly fix the time when banks must restore
funds to their customers after paying over binding stop payment orders. 46
whenever it improperly pays an item and cannot charge the drawer's account.
Desiree Mines Ltd. v. Provident Nat'l Bank, 7 Pa. D. & C.3d 163 (1978)(section 4-407 not restricted to stop orders); see Sunshine, 34 N.Y.2d 404, 314
N.E.2d 860, 358 N.Y.S. 2d 133. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 6, at 801. In
addition to section 4-407, the Code affords the payor bank specific theories of
recovery where items have been forged, altered or stolen. Thus, sections 3-417
and 4-207 impose warranty liability on presenters and transferers. The bank may
also seek reimbursement from its customer when it pays these items by
establishing that he breached duties to protect it under sections 3-405, 3-406 and
4-406.
46 1n early code drafts, the customer's rights to stop payment and to a prompt
recredit when the bank paid over a binding stop payment order were assumed,
not suprisingly since these were the rules under the Negotiable Instruments Law,
the Code's predecessor. The bank's right to reimburse itself was, however,
expressly provided for in section 730 of U.C.C. Proposed Final Draft No. 1
Article III (Apr. 15, 1988):
A payor bank paying an item which it may not charge to its depositor's account
is subrogated to the rights against prior parties of any prior holder who receives
the proceeds or to the rights of the drawer, the payee or any subsequent party
against any such holder either on the instrument or arising out of the transaction
in which the item was issued or transferred.
The comment to this section described its unjust enrichment rationale:
The bank has parted with money and cannot, under its implied contract, charge
the drawer's account. However, no social policy requires that such action be
penalized by denying all recovery especially if the effect is to enrich a wrongdoer
unjustly. Take, for example, the matter of payment in violation of a stop-order.
The drawer presumably stopped payment because he believed he had a defense.
Assume that he did... Having kept his bank balance the drawer sees no need to
spend time and money suing the payee, who will, therefore, keep his ill-gotten
gains unless the payor bank can recover the payment... But the bank was not
an officious volunteer, and prevention of unjust enrichment would seem to
require that the bank be given an action in the place of the drawer against the
wrongdoing payee.
But what if the drawer wrongfully stopped payment; his supposed defense not
being a good one. Here the payee keeps the money and the drawer is wrongfully
enriched, keeping the purchased goods and not paying for them. The bank,
having discharged a valid obligation should be subrogated to the rights of the
payee or holder, especially if a holder in due course. (original emphasis
omitted).
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Fair dealing requires that the bank not deprive customers of funds to
which they are entitled, pay interest on wrongfully withheld funds, and
make good on any checks that were returned NSF because improper
payments were charged to their account. Dollars-and-cents
considerations, which may or may not be consistent with fair dealing,
determine whether, and at what point, banks will recredit a customer's
account. Until a recredit occurs, the bank will have the use of the disputed
funds and the ensuing profits. 4 7 If the bank concludes that it will cost less
to litigate the claim than restore the credit, the bank will not be inclined to
recredit and make amends for the withheld funds and returned checks.
4 8
U.C.C. § 3-730 (1988), Proposed Final Draft No. 1, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE.
In the U.C.C. Proposed Final Draft (Spr. 1950), the customer's right to stop
payment appeared for the first time in section 4-203. Section 4-203 was identical
to the current section 4-403 except that there was no subsection 3. Proposed
section 4-402(4), which authorized the bank to seek reimbursement, provided
that "the bank has no right to charge the customer's account" while maintaining
its section 4-402(4) cause of action.
In the Official Draft of the Code, promulgated in 1952, the stop payment
and subrogation sections took their current form. Subsection 3 was added to
section 4-403 and the express prohibition of the bank charging its customer's
account was dropped. Official comment 9 to section 4-403, which also appeared
in this version, explained:
When a bank pays an item over a stop payment order, such payment
automatically involves a charge to the customer's account. Subsection (3)
imposes upon the customer the burden of establishing the fact and amount of
loss resulting from such payment. Consequently, until such burden is
maintained either in a court action or to the satisfaction of the bank, the bank is
not obligated to recredit the amount of the item to the customer's account and,
therefore, is not liable for the dishonor of other items due to insufficent funds
caused by the payment contrary to the stop payment order.
The Comment was debated before the New York Law Revision Commission
which disapproved of it and later eliminated it. The Commission was troubled by
the fact that the bank's liability for payment over a binding stop payment order
was not based on any breach of a duty of care but for the improper debit for an
item that should not have been paid. Pointing out that "nothing in Article 4
would change the rule that [the bank's] liability is on the debt," it opined that the
reference to "burden of establishing loss is confusing." 1 N.Y. STATE LAW
REVISION COMMISSION REPORT 466-68 (1954). Comment 9 was subsequently
deleted from the 1958 official text of the Code. See generally WHITE & SUMMERS,
supra note 6, at 796-97.
47See Bank of El Paso v. Statler, 550 S.W.2d 383 (Tex. Civ. App. 1987)
(bank accountable to customer for "profits" on wrongfully withheld funds).4SAn attorney for a large Ohio bank, who decides whether an account will be
recredited after an item is paid over a binding stop payment order, described
these two different cases:
In one case, our customer ordered a huge crane, stopped payment on the check
and then rejected the crane. We missed the stop payment order. When the
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In that case, the customer's only alternative is to litigate. If the bank's
projection about litigation costs is correct, however, no suit will arise. Any
loss from the improper payment will fall on the customer, disrupting the
Code's culpability scheme. If customers have incentives that serve to offset
their litigation costs, however, the Code's plan might operate as the
drafters intended. Such incentives exist when the bank faces tort damages
for its wrongful refusal to restore funds to them.
Ill. THE BREACH OF THE COVENANT OF FAIR DEALING
A venerable common law maxim holds that parties are free to refuse
to perform their contracts if they pay damages. 4 9 The breach and
subsequent damages are traditionally established through litigation, with
each side bearing its own costs. 50 A breaching party may force the
customer demanded that we recredit, we sent our security department out to investi-
gate it. The customer swore that the crane didn't work right-that the seller
breached warranties in the sales transaction. The seller's story is that the buyer
didn't know how to operate the crane. To top it off, we find out that the buyer is the
seller's son-in-law. We suspect that there might be some fraud involved. The seller
now has the crane-it's sitting on his loading dock-and the money. This is a
hundred thousand dollar crane, mind you, and we're not sure what's going on. We
can't recredit. We're going to hold tight and let the customer sue us.
We had another case where a welfare mother paid $200 for a TV set that didn't
work so she stopped payment. We missed that one, too. The seller disappeared
and she's stuck with this broken-down TV. It seemed pretty clear to us that she
had been taken and we didn't want to bother litigating a $200 case. So we
recredited her account.
4 9 The only universal consequence of a legally binding promise is that the law
makes the promisor pay damages if the promised event does not come to pass. In
every case it leaves him free from interference until the time for fulfillment has
gone by, and therefore free to break his contract if he chooses.
O.HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 301 (1923). A current justification for the
maxim is the so-called "Efficient Breach" theory. This theory holds that a
contract is broken when the breaching party calculates that he will receive a net
benefit after paying damages. The duty to pay damages in lieu of performance,
moreover, prevents waste because resources are not consumed needlessly in
producing unwanted goods or performing undervalued services. See R. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND THE LAW 106 (3d ed. 1986); Birmingham, Breach of
Contract, Damage Measures and Economic Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273 (1970).
5 0Critics contend that the "Efficient Breach" theory, which depends on the
organizing force of expectation damages, does not adequately account for these
unrecoverable "transaction" costs. "[T]o assume the absence of such costs is to
create a 'model' that is very different from the real world of contracting parties."
KNAPP & CRYSTAL, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW 885 (1987) (citing Farber,
Reassessing the Economic Efficiency of Compensatory Damages for Breach of Contract, 66
VA. L. REV. 1443, 1448 (1980)).
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aggrieved party to establish an indisputable liability through wasteful
litigation. 51 Such stonewalling5 2 has prompted courts to impose tort
liability for breach of the "covenant of fair dealing."
The covenant of fair dealing is not found in the contract. It is a
separate duty imposed on certain contracting parties. 53 Because of a
perceived public interest in the insurance contract, the covenant was
originally used to protect insureds from unreasonable refusals by insurers
to pay claims. 54 It was then extended to employers 55 and banks.
56 In
addition to recovering for noneconomic losses such as mental distress,
5 7
51Aggrieved parties may sometimes cut these expenses by obtaining an
interlocutory summary judgment on the issue of liability alone. See, e.g., FED. R.
Civ. P. 56(c).
52E.g., Thompson Enters., Inc. v. Coskrey, 168 Ga. App. 181, 308 S.E.2d
399 (1983) (the "so sue me" ploy).
53"Whereas contract actions are created to enforce the intentions of the
parties to the agreement, tort law is primarily designed to vindicate 'social
policy'." Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d. 654, 683, 765 P.2d 373,
389, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 227 (1988) (en banc) (citing W. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS 613 (4th ed. 1971)); see also Luxonomy Cars v. Citibank, N.A., 65
A.D.2d 549, 408 N.Y.S.2d 951 (1978) (the duty is separate from the contract
and arises independently of it).
54E.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 433, 426 P.2d 173, 178,
58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 18 (1967) (en banc).
55E.g., Foley, 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211.
56E.g., Tribby v. Northwestern Bank, 217 Mont. 196, 704 P.2d 409 (1985).
In Commercial Cotton Co. v. United California Bank, 163 Cal. App. 3d 511,
516, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551, 554 (1985), a California court of appeals reasoned that
the same public interest that imposed the covenant on the insurance industry
imposed it on banks. Concluding that banking was a "highly regulated industry
performing a vital public service substantially affecting the public welfare," the
California court said:
A depositor in a noninterest bearing checking account, except for state or federal
regulatory oversight, is totally dependent on the banking institution to which it
entrusts deposited funds and depends on the bank's honesty and expertise to
protect them. While banks do provide services for the depositor by way of
monitoring deposits and withdrawals, they do so for the very commercial
purpose of making money by using the deposited funds. The depositor allows
the bank to use those funds in exchange for the convenience of not having to
conduct transactions in cash and the concomitant security of having the bank
safeguard them. The relationship of bank to depositor is at least quasi-fiduciary.
See Note, "Contort": Tortious Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in
Non-Insurance, Commercial Contracts-Its Existence and Desirability, 60 NOTRE DAME
L.REV. 510 (1985).
57First Nat'l Bank v. Twombly, 213 Mont. 66, 689 P.2d 1226 (1984); Crisci,
66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13. The injury must, however, be
"substantial." Commercial Cotton, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 517, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
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an aggrieved party may also be entitled to punitive damages and
attorney's fees for the breach. 5 8 Today, few courts apply the covenant of
fair dealing to all commercial transactions.
5 9
As the courts have molded the concept, the covenant is breached by a
refusal to pay benefits to which an aggrieved party is presently entitled
under the contract. 60 A countermanded check is not properly payable and
a bank would therefore appear to breach the covenant when it refuses to
recredit its customer's account after being notified that it violated a
binding stop payment order.6 1 To determine whether the tort action might
arise after a bank pays over a binding stop payment order, it is necessary
58 Tribby, 217 Mont. 196, 704 P.2d 409.
59Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752,
686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984) (no fiduciary relationship and no
absence of arms-length bargaining).
60Davis v. First Nat'l Bank, 124 Ariz. 458, 605 P.2d 37 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1979); Bowler v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 53 N.J. 313, 327, 250 A.2d 580, 588
(1969) ("implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing that the insurer will not
do anything to injure the right of its policyholder to receive the benefits of his
contract"); April Enter., Inc. v. KTTV, 147 Cal. App. 3d 805, 816, 195 Cal.
Rptr. 421, 425 (1983) ("a party to a contract will not do anything which would
deprive the other party of the benefits of the contract"); see Sawyer v. Bank of
Am., 83 Cal. App. 3d 135, 139, 145 Cal. Rptr. 623, 625 (1978) (covenant
breached by actions with "motive intentionally to frustrate the obligee's
enjoyment of contract rights").
At first, the courts required that the plaintiff prove "bad faith" conduct,
which they described as "dishonesty, fraud or concealment." Crisci, 66 Cal. 2d at
430, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16. Because of its imprecision, the bad
faith requirement was eventually eliminated and the emphasis was placed on fair
dealing. See Egan v. Mutual of Omaha, 24 Cal. 3d 809, 598 P.2d 452, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 482 (1979) (implied covenant imposed duty on insurer to thoroughly
investigate claim before it could reasonably and in good faith deny payments to
insured). According to one court, "blind faith," without a reasonable basis, is
not fair dealing. Crisci, 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13.
61In Commercial Cotton, 163 Cal. App. 3d. at 516, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 554, a
California court of appeals held that the covenant was breached when the payor
bank asserted a spurious defense against its customer after it paid checks with
forged indorsements. The court said, "depositors reasonably expect a bank not
to claim nonexistent legal defenses to avoid reimbursement when the bank
negligently disburses the entrusted funds." Although Commercial Cotton has been
roundly debated in the California appeals courts, see, e.g., Price v. Wells Fargo
Bank, 213 Cal. App. 3d 465, 261 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1989); Lee v. Bank of Am., 218
Cal. App. 3d 914, 923, 267 Cal. Rptr. 387, 392 (1990) (Johnson, J., concurring
and dissenting), it has not been overruled. Several states have applied the
covenant to banks. See generally Annotation, Bank's Liability for Breach of Implied
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 55 A.L.R. 4th 1026 (1987). A few,
however, have not. E.g., Keeton v. Bank of Red Bay, 466 So. 2d 937 (Ala.
1985).
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to identify exactly when the Code obligates the bank to recredit its
customer's account.
IV. INDISPUTABLE CODE LIABILITIES
When, as in the typical forgery and alteration cases, the improper
payment has not been fixed, the bank should be permitted to litigate
genuine factual issues without fear of tort liability for its refusal to
recredit. Yet, when a binding stop payment order is overlooked, banks
force their customers to become plaintiffs to receive an indisputable
recredit.
The issue in these cases is not the bank's liability for the improper
payment, which must be conceded, 62 but whether the bank must recredit at
all. Customers contend that, upon notification to the bank, they are entitled
to an immediate recredit and damages for the wrongful dishonor 63 of any
checks that were returned NSF as a result of the bank's improper payment.
The banks rejoin that the customer must show that the stop payment order,
though binding, was legally justified before they are required to recredit the
account and pay damages for dishonoring checks.
Courts have held for both sides. 6 4 The legal issue focuses on the
relationship between section 4-403, which gives the customer the right to
stop payment, and section 4-407,65 which gives the bank reimbursement
62
"A payment in violation of an effective direction to stop payment is an
improper payment, even though it is made by mistake or inadvertance." U.C.C.
§ 4-403 official comment 8.
63See U.C.C. § 4-402.
64Compare Hughes v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 127 Misc. 2d 209, 484
N.Y.S.2d 1000 (1985) with Southeast First Nat'l Bank v. Atlantic Telec, Inc.,
389 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980), review denied, 398 So. 2d. 779 (1981).
New York and Georgia favor the customers. See Hughes, 127 Misc. 2d 209, 484
N.Y.S.2d 1000; Whitmore v. Woodbury, 154 Ga. App. 159, 267 S.E.2d 783
(1980), rev'd on separate grounds, 246 Ga. 349, 271 S.E.2d 491 (1980); see also
Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 63 Ohio St. 2d 220, 407 N.E.2d 519
(1980) (bank must recredit when any improper payment made)., Most courts,
however, favor the banks. The leading commentators are unsure: "What
outcome did the drafters intend? They seem to have spoken out of both sides of
their mouths." WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 6, at 797.
6 5U.C.C. § 4-407 provides:
If a payor bank has paid an item over the stop payment order of the drawer . ..
for otherwise under circumstances giving a basis for objection by the
drawer . .. , to prevent unjust enrichment and only to the extent necessary to
prevent loss to the bank by reason of its payment of the item, the payor bank
shall be subrogated to the rights
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rights against the Code's "culpable party" when it pays a countermanded
check.
Under section 4-407, the culpable party will be the party in the
underlying transaction that was unjustly enriched by the bank's
payment. 6 6 Section 4-407 requires the culpable party to make restitution
to the bank for its loss. 67 While the bank is prohibited from charging its
customer's account when it pays over a binding stop payment order,
section 4-407 authorizes the bank to reimburse itself for its "loss" by
recovering, in a proper case, from its customer. Therefore, the culpable
party may turn out to be the bank's customer.
The customer may also suffer a "loss" in the underlying transaction
because the bank paid the check. The goods or services for which the
check was issued might not have conformed to the contract, hence, the
stop payment order. Section 4-403(3) imposes "the burden of establishing
the fact and amount of loss" on the customer whose binding stop payment
order is ignored. 68 The conflict thus becomes which party, the bank or the
customer, must establish its "loss."
(a) of any holder in due course on the item against the drawer . . .; and
(b) of the payee or any other holder of the item against the drawer . . . either on
the item or under the transaction out of which the item arose; and
(c) of the drawer . . . against the payee or any other holder of the item with
respect to the transaction out of which the item arose.
66Under the doctrine of unjust enrichment "one person should not be
permitted unjustly to enrich himself at the expense of another, but should be
required to make restitution ....- BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1377 (5th ed.
1979). "The essential question is whether there is the unjust retention of benefit
to the loss of another, or the retention of money or property of another against
the fundamental principles of justice or equity and good conscience." Starcraft
Co. v. C.J. Heck Co., 748 F.2d 982, 988, reh'g denied, 753 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir.
1989) (quoting Fun Time Centers, Inc. v. Continental Nat'l Bank, 517 S.W.2d
877, 884 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974)).
67'A person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is
required to make restitution to the other." RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1
(1937). Under prior law, the bank's cause of action was for restitution. See NEW
YORK STATE LAW REVISION COMMISSION. 2 A STUDY OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 1558-59 (1955 and photo. reprint 1980). U.C.C. section 4-
407 subsumed the theory. See Sunshine, 34 N.Y.2d 404, 314 N.E.2d 860.
6 8U.C.C. section 4-403(3) was a concession offered to the banks when the
drafters refused to backdown on allowing oral stop payment orders. According to
one of the Article 4 drafters, during the Article 4 debates, "somebody said from
the floor would it not be fair if at least in this situation the burden of proof was
placed upon the depositor to establish that there was a stop payment order and
the extent of his damages." 1 NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION,
HEARINGS OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 467 (1955 and photo. reprint
1980) (comments of Walter Malcolm).
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Banks argue that the customer must prove that the payee or other
holder could not enforce the instrument, or the underlying transaction for
which it was given, before they are obligated to recredit. If the customer
cannot meet this burden, it did not suffer any section 403(3) "loss" and,
consequently, was unjustly enriched by it. The banks argue that they
should not be responsible for any returned checks. By failing to prove that
the stop payment order was legally justified, the customer, in effect, did
not prove a right to stop payment; therefore, the bank acted properly in
reimbursing itself from the account when it paid the check. 69
Under this view, the customer has the ultimate burden of proof and
the bank, acting as a plaintiff in a subrogation suit under section 4-407,
has no burden of proof. Thus, the bank may assert its subrogation rights
defensively in a suit brought by the customer to force the bank to recredit
and to recover for the NSF checks.
The opposing view requires the bank to restore the disputed credit
and then affirmatively pursue whatever subrogation rights it might
possess. This scheme is modeled after insurance subrogation where the
insurance company first pays its insured and then pursues culpable
parties. 70 This view states that under its contract with the insured, the
insurer must deliver benefits due to its insured before seeking
reimbursement. The same, they reason, should apply to banks. 71
69White & Summers concur. "Having sustained [its right to debit the
account] with respect to the first check, it follows that the bank may dishonor
checks subsequently presented against insufficient funds." WHITE & SUMMERS
supra note 6, at 797-98. Their position here, however, is inconsistent with their
position on NSF checks that result when postdated checks are paid prematurely.
If the bank jumps the gun, "the bank's improper payment of the post-dated
check led it to dishonor the [subsequent] check wrongfully." Id. at 766-67.
Because the premature payment of a post-dated check is also improper, see
U.C.C. § 3-114(2), the bank would have no right to debit the account with either
check. The drafters of the revised articles 3 and 4 seem to agree: "The loss from
an item contrary to a binding stop payment order may include damages for
dishonor of subsequent items pursuant to Section 4-402." Section 4-403(3)
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE Proposed Final Draft (Apr. 12, 1990) [hereinafter
Proposed Draft].
70After reimbursing its insured, "the insurer is 'substituted' for the insured
in regard to either all or some portion of the rights that the insured has to receive
compensation from another source. [In its subrogation suit,] the insurer is
"usually viewed as 'standing in the shoes' of the insured." KEETON & WIDISS,
INSURANCE LAW 219 (1988). Because of their fear of juries, insurers will seek,
with mixed success, to bring their subrogation suit in the name of their insured.
The problem is that the insurer, not the insured, "will derive the benefit of a
favorable determination" in the subrogation suit. Id. at 241.
71
"The bank's contract obligations with their customers are separate and
distinct from the commercial transactions which the customers may have with
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Since insurers are subject to tort liability for their refusal to pay policy
benefits to which the insured is indisputably entitled, the insurance subroga-
tion analogy is a powerful litigation argument.72 However, it falters in that it
has tended to equate the section 4-403(3) "loss" with the wrongful charge to
the customer's account and resolves the statutory issue by brute force. 73 If the
section 4-403(3) "loss" is synonymous with the wrongful charge to the cus-
tomer's account for the improper payment, the customer's "burden" under
that section would be nonexistent. 74 Nevertheless, this view makes sense
under the Code. If the payor bank has an insurer that reimburses it for
improper payment, which larger banks do, the bank would recredit its cus-
tomer's account and the insurer would become the plaintiff in a section 4-407
subrogation suit. 75 This view prevailed under the Uniform Negotiable In-
strument Law, the Code's predecessor.76
others . . . .Here, the debtor-creditor contract [of deposit] governs the bank's
liability. The bank's subrogation rights ...are [therefore] irrelevant." Hughes,
127 Misc. 2d at 216, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 1005.
72So mused the dissent in Lee, 218 Cal. App. 3d 914, 267 Cal. Rptr. 387
(1990) (Johnson, J., concurring and dissenting). In this case, however, the bank
promptly recredited when the customer complained about the charge to his
account.
73Hughes, 127 Misc. 2d 209, 484 N.Y.S.2d 1000. Other courts have used this
rationale to manipulate the burden of proof in the customer's favor when the
customer brings suit. E.g., Cicci v. Lincoln Nat'l & Trust Co., 46 Misc. 2d 465,
260 N.Y.S.2d 100 (1965). In Thomas v. Marine Midland Tinkers Nat'l Bank,
86 Misc. 2d 284, 381 N.Y.S.2d 797 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1976), the court held that
plaintiff customer made out a prima facie case by proving the bank's payment
over a binding stop payment order. Although the ultimate burden of proof
remained on the customer to prove his "loss," the burden of coming forward
shifted to the bank to show an absence of loss by the customer.
74Commenting on Thomas, 86 Misc. 2d 284, 381 N.Y.S.2d 797, White &
Summers opine:
The Thomas interpretation does violence to the drafters intent under 4-403.
While we do not think a court's disregard of rather clear statutory directions is
appropriate, we suspect that the bankers . . . who had a large hand in the
drafting of Article 4 here suffer the consequences of being a bit too greedy in the
drafting process.
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 6, at 799.
75Pointing out that large banks typically have insurers who reimburse them
when they pay over stop payment orders, the Hughes court, 127 Misc. 2d at 216
n.7, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 1005 n.7, said that for small banks "subrogation ... is
more than an analogy, it is a fact." See Commercial Ins. Co. v. Scalamandre, 56
Misc. 2d 628, 289 N.Y.S.2d 489 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1967) (bank recredited after
paying over binding stop payment order and obtained payment from plaintiff
insurer for "loss sustained by mistake").
76Chase Nat'l Bank v. Battat, 297 N.Y. 185, 78 N.E.2d 465 (1948) (validity
or invalidity of underlying transaction no defense to bank); see generally E.
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V. THE CASE FOR PROMPT RECREDITING
The banks' argument has little merit. It is contrary to Code payment
principles because payment over a binding stop payment order is
improper. The bank has no right to reimburse itself from its customer's
account. Therefore, it should be required to pay interest on the withheld
funds and to answer for checks that were returned NSF because of the
improper debit. 7 7 Additionally, the bank's refusal to recredit distorts the
rights in the underlying transaction. 78 The customer must forgo exactly
what it sought by the stop payment order, namely, the tactical advantage
over the payee. 79
The bank's position can be justified on the ground that there is no
other way to reconcile section 4-403(3)'s mandate that the customer prove
"the fact and amount of his loss" with section 4-407. The contrary view,
the banks assert, renders section 4-403(3) useless. Yet, if there is nothing
left of section 4-403(3) under the contrary view, the banks' view virtually
destroys whatever stop payment rights a customer has under the Code.
A literal reading of these two sections supports the banks'
interpretation. Under unjust enrichment principles, which require the
customer to make restitution to the bank for whatever benefits the bank
conferred on it by paying the check, the section 4-403(3) "loss"
undoubtedly means more than the improper charge to the account.
FARNSWORTH, COMMERCIAL PAPER COURSES AND MATERIALS 215-19 (3d
ed. 1984). The banks responded with exculpatory clauses that were upheld by the
courts. E.g., Gaita v. Windsor Bank, 251 N.Y. 152, 167 N.E. 203 (1929).
77This is the view of the revised Article 4: "The loss from payment of an
item contrary to a binding stop payment order may include damages for dishonor
of subsequent items pursuant to Section 4-402." Proposed Draft, § 4-403(3).
78For example, under U.C.C. section 2-601, a buyer may always reject
goods that fail or whose tender of delivery fail in any respect to confrom with the
contract, rightfully or wrongfully. In either case, he will be able to foist the goods
back on the seller and "rightfully" withhold payment for them. See U.C.C. § 2-
709 (seller's action for the "price"). A buyer may also accept non-conforming
goods without waiving the breach. See U.C.C. § 2-717. If the bank refuses to
recredit his account, the buyer's Article 2 rights to manipulate the price with a
stop payment order in these ways is defeated.
79Assume, for example, that buyer orders a fixed price dishwasher from
seller, a large retailer, and then cancels the order. As a matter of good will, seller
will probably swallow his claim for the lost profit, see U.C.C. § 2-708(2), and
accept buyer's offer of termination, see U.C.C. § 2-106(3), rather than hold
buyer for the breach. A countermanded check gives buyer some bargaining
muscle or, depending on how one looks at it, allows him to "weasle out of" the
contract more easily. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 6, at 801.
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Banking law is more, however, than Article 4 stop payment orders and
bank subrogation. These rights are an integral part of the Code's general
culpability scheme.
Until liability to reimburse is fixed, the bank will not know the
culpable party. Thus, section 4-407 authorizes the bank to seek
reimbursement by proceeding against all possible parties. 80 Such parties
include its customer, 81 the payee, or other holder on the underlying
transaction. 8 2 If it proceeds against its customer, the bank will subrogate
to the "rights" of a "holder in due course" 83 or of any other "holder" 84
on the item or under the transaction out of which the item arose. These
rights, which do not exist in a vacuum, are not defined in section 4-407.
Rather, the bank must look to other Code sections.
A payor bank acquires reimbursement rights against its customers
under Articles 3 and 4 whenever it pays a check, properly or otherwise. If
the item was properly paid, Article 4 grants the bank the right to enforce
the customer's implied duty to reimburse and the bank need not look
elsewhere. 85 Yet, the bank will also take by transfer86 whatever rights the
8 Professional Sav. Bank v. Galloway Farm Nursery, Inc., 514 So. 2d 76, 77
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) ("most comprehensive and effective remedy
possible"). Unjust enrichment of all the defendants is not required. South Shore
Nat'l Bank v. Donner, 104 N.J. Super. 169, 177, 249 A.2d 25, 30 (1969).
"Permitting retention of [the drawer and payee] is not unlike an inverse
interpleader. At least one, and possibly both of the real parties in interest have
been unjustly enriched. The bank stands as an embarrassed, but innocent, third
party." ProfessionalSav. Bank, 514 So. 2d 76, 77 n.2. See Manufacturer's Hanover
Trust Co. v. Ava Indus., Inc., 98 Misc. 2d 619, 414 N.Y.S.2d 425 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1978) (even outsiders who contributed to the bank's loss are properly joined).
8
"U.C.C. § 4-407(a) and (b). A stop payment order attempts to dishonor the
check. See U.C.C. § 3-507(1)(a) ("an instrument is dishonored" when payment
is refused.) Upon dishonor, a holder may pursue the drawer on either the
instrument or the underlying obligation. See U.C.C. § 3-802(1)(b). In seeking
reimbursement against its customer, the bank will subrogate, respectively, to the
rights of"the holder in due course" and "of the payee or any other holder on the
item." These subsections are intended to confer on the bank whatever "rights"
any "holder" in the transaction had to enforce either the instrument or the
underlying transaction that generated it. U.C.C. § 4-407 official comments
I & 2.
82U.C.C. § 4-407(c).
831d. § 3-302(1).
841d. § 1-201(20).
8 5 It is fundamental that upon proper payment of a draft the drawee may charge
the account of the drawer . . .since the draft itself authorizes the payment for
the drawer's account and carries an implied promise to reimburse the drawee."
U.C.C. § 4-401 official comment 1.
8 61d. § 3-201(1). Dalton v. George B. Hatley Co., Inc., 634 S.W.2d 374,
379 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982). A payor bank acquires such rights on payment. Nida
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holder had to the instrument or in the underlying transaction. These
rights are asserted under section 4-407 when it makes an improper
payment. They are enunciated in sections 3-305, 8 7 3-306,88 and enforced
under section 3-307.89
Section 3-305 supplies the payor bank with the rights it may assert
against its customer under section 4-407(a), namely "the rights of a
holder in due course." 90 Section 3-306 supplies the bank with the rights it
will assert against its customer under section 4-407(b), namely, "the
rights of one not [a] holder in due course." 9 1 As drawers of checks, bank
customers will be liable to them under their Article 3 contracts.
92
Article 3 rights to be paid are enforced against drawers under section
3-307. Although the party to be paid has the ultimate burden of proof, his
task as a plaintiff is facilitated by certain presumptions. 93 The holder
v. Michael, 34 Mich. App. 290, 191 N.W.2d 151 (1971); see Commercial Sav.
Bank v. G &J Wood Prod. Co., 46 Mich. App. 133, 207 N.W.2d 401 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1973). Cf. U.C.C. § 3-415(5) (accommodation party who pays also has
right of recourse on the instrument).
87U.C.C. § 3-305 is entitled, "Rights of a Holder in Due Course."
According to U.C.C. § 1-109, "section captions are part of this Act."
'
88U.C.C. § 3-306 is entitled, "Rights of One Not Holder in Due Course."
.
89U.C.C. § 3-307 is entitled, "Burden of Establishing Signatures, Defenses
and Due Course."
9 0U.C.C. § 3-305.
9 1 d. § 3-306.92U.C.C. § 3-413(2) provides:
The drawer engages that upon dishonor of the draft and any necessary notice of
dishonor . . . he will pay the amount of the draft to the holder ....
Under § 3-511(2)(b), because the stop order amounts to a "dishonor" of the
instrument by the drawer, see U.C.C. § 3-507(1)(a), notice of dishonor would be
excused and the holder would have an immediate right of recourse against the
drawer. See U.C.C. § 3-507(2). So will the bank if the drawer is the culpable
party under § 4-407(a) or (b).
93See U.C.C. § 3-307(2). Official comment 2 to this section explains how the
presumptions work:
[A] holder makes out his case by mere production of the instrument, and is entitled
to recover in the absence of any further evidence. The defendant has the burden of
establishing any and all defenses, not only in the first instance but by a
preponderance of the total evidence .... If [a person] establishes a transfer which
gives him the rights of a holder (Section 3-201), this provision becomes applicable,
he is then entitled to recover unless the defendant establishes a defense.
"The normal scheme of the Uniform Commercial Code . . . contemplates that a
bank making an erroneous payment over a stop order can recover from either the
drawer or payee. If the drawer has no defense to payment of the check, the bank
recovers by charging the drawer's account." Swiss Credit Bank v. Balink, 614 F.2d
1269, 1272 (10th Cir. 1980); see Bryan v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 628 S.W.2d 761 (Tex.
1982).
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makes out a prima facie case by proving his right to enforce the
instrument. 94 The drawer then "establishes the fact and amount of loss"
to the extent that he proves a viable defense. 9 5 If such a defense is made,
the holder will again have the burden of going forward. If such rights are
available to the holder under section 3-305, he may prove that he has the
rights of a holder in due course and overcome any defenses that cannot be
asserted against such holders. 9 6 If holder in due course rights are
unavailable, the holder may then assert whatever rights are available to it
under section 3-306 and enforce the underlying obligation that gave rise
to the instrument. 9 7
All holders are subject to these burdens of proof when they seek to
enforce their rights to Article 3 instruments. Improperly paying banks
that assume their position by subrogating to their rights should be treated
identically. The newly revised Article 3, recently approved by the
American Law Institute, endorses this view.9 8
This view can be further supported. Until the bank's rights are fixed
in the section 4-407 suit, under section 3-307 procedures, the customer
will bear a "contingent" as opposed to a "fixed" or indisputable liability
to the bank. A contingent liability must be fixed to become enforceable. 99
The customer's liability at this stage is identical to the type of liability the
bank typically bears to the customer when a claim of improper payment is
made. If the customer has no right to a recredit until it fixes the bank's
liability for the improper payment, the bank should have no right to
94See U.C.C. § 3-307(2).
95Id. § 3-307(2). Such defenses are found in U.C.C. section 3-305.96U.C.C.§ 3-305.
971d. § 3-802(1)(b); see supra note 76.
9 The payor bank would become the "person entitled to enforce the
instrument under the proposed final draft section 3-301. According to the official
comment to this section, "the definition recognizes that enforcement is not
limited to holders. It . . .includes a person that acquired rights of a holder by
subrogation or by [transfer]."
One writer describes section 4-407 as "a procedural device for the
accomplishment of . . . substantive principles." Rogers, The Irrelevance of
Negotiable Instruments Concepts in the Law of the Check-Based Payment System, 65 TEX.
L. REV. 929, 951 n.70 (1987). Professor Rogers would probably quibble with my
analysis, indeed, with revised Article 3 as well, since he believes that negotiable
instruments principles should not guide payment transfers. He complains,
however, that the prevailing interpretation of section 4-403(3) renders stop
payment rights "nugatory." Id. at 951-52 n.72.
99See Escambia Chem. Corp. v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 396 So. 2d 66 (Ala.
1981) (the fund sought to be garnished must be due absolutely and without
contingency).
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withhold funds from its customer until it fixes its reimbursement rights
against the customer.100
Finally, this interpretation is consistent with established law that
predates the Code. Unless the customer is insolvent, a bank may only set
off a fixed indebtedness against its customer's account.1 0 1 It is prohibited
from charging contingent liabilities. If it does, it will be liable for
prejudgment interest dating from the wrongful charge "under the
equitable principle that one should be compensated for the unauthorized
use or detention of his money." 102 The bank should have the same liability
to its customer when it overlooks his binding stop payment order and
charges his account for the improper payment.
VI. CONCLUSION
When claims of improper payment are asserted by customers, banks
exercise an almost unfettered discretion in determining whether to restore
credits. This is not an unreasonable position when disputed factual issues
exist. Until the case is litigated and the liabilities are fixed, it may be
impossible to know whether the payment was improper or whether the
customer bears some responsibility for it. Contemporaneously, the bank
would have no notice that it was withholding funds that belonged to its
customer and could not therefore breach the covenant of fair dealing.
The bank does, however, expose itself to tort liability when it pays over
a binding stop payment order and refuses to recredit. It cannot contend
that a proper payment was made or that it had the right to charge its
customer's account. Nor will it have any Code defense based on its
customer's misconduct. Whatever reimbursement obligations exist will be
fixed.
In the meantime, the customer's right to draw on the funds is
indisputable. Fair dealing requires that the bank acknowledge its errors to
its customer before launching its search for the Code's culpable party.
10 0
"The bank can hardly claim an opposing party has been unjustly
enriched when the bank is holding the funds in question under color of right."
Sunshine, 34 N.Y.2d at 415, 314 N.E.2d at 866 n.7, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 122.
i0lE.g., Gonsalves v. Bank of Am., 16 Cal. 2d 169, 105 P.2d 118 (1940). For
the Code rule, see, e.g., Elizarraras v. Bank of El Paso, 631 F.2d 366 (5th Cir.
1980).
102First Nat'l Bank v. Estate of Hackworth, 673 S.W.2d 218, 224 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1984) (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Stahl Petroleum Co., 569 S.W.2d
480, 485 (Tex. 1978)).
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